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I. INTRODUCTION: ROUGH SEAS

Pure notice pleading may well be a thing of the past. The long-standing tenet
of notice pleading in American jurisprudence, that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief,"1 is no more. From 1957 until 2007 this language provided a basis for
applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 2 The ConIey "no set of facts"
language combined with the minimal requirements of Rule 8 established a
framework for evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. However, in May 2007
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Conke language, explaining in BellAtlantic
Co p. v. Twomby that the seminal approach to pleading standards had "earned its
retirement."3 The Twomby Court emphatically explained that a complaint (at least
the antitrust complaint before the Court) must establish "plausible" grounds for
liability rather than a mere possibility of liability.4 Despite the repeated references
to "plausibility" and the Court's unequivocal rejection of Conley, the Twomby Court
failed to clearly define the meaning and scope of its new take on pleading
requirements. To complicate matters, two weeks after Twomby the Supreme Court
decided Erickson v.Pardus,which explicitly rejected the notion that Twomby created
across-the-board heightened pleading standards.' Notwithstanding the Court's
clear statements, many commentators have read Erickson narrowly and confined
its holding to its facts.6
Understandably, Twomby and Erickson left practitioners, scholars, and judges
unclear on the status of notice pleading. Some have concluded that the plausibility
standard applies broadly, requirinig heightened pleading in a wide range of civil
suits.' Others have taken a restrictive view, concluding that Twomby had minimal

' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a complaint to provide a "short and plain statement of the

2

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief").
' Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
4 Id. at 555-70.
s Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (holding that apro se litigant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint should not have been dismissed despite plaintiff's scant assertion of "substantial harm').
6 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 974-75 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying
Twomby plausibility requirements to Title VII action); Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club,
Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 173 n.7 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that Twomb plausibility is not limited to

antitrust and is equally applicable to employment discrimination claims and equitable
indemnification claims). This "broad" approach most strongly comports with FED. R. CIV. P. 1
("[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings'), assuming that Twomb4
is simply an interpretation of FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
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effects on traditional pleading standards. 8 And finally, some have taken an
intermediate approach, explaining that Twomby plausibility is required in some
cases but not others, depending on the nature of the claim(s) or claimant(s).' This
third approach is the most in accord with the reasoning and policy concerns
underlying the Court's decision in Twomby and will be revisited.' °
Given that the scope and impact of Twombly remain unclear, it is worthwhile
to consider whether the decision will (and should) require heightened pleading in
areas other than antitrust suits. Defendants accused of copyright infringement will
undoubtedly invoke Twomby as establishing a heightened pleading standard in
motions to dismiss. The validity of this application of Twombv in the infringement
context depends on several factors. First, the cost of discovery in infringement
suits may be important. The Court in Twombly emphasized the defendant's burden
where discovery is likely to be exceptionally expensive." Also, Form 19 in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides an example of a sufficient
copyright infringement complaint, may influence the appropriate pleading
standard in infringement suits.' 2 Further, copyright infringement pleading
standards may be evaluated in light of their unique substantive requirements.
Specifically, infringement liability requires proof of two elements: ownership and
copying. 3 Applying Twomby to infringement complaints could create substantial

8 See, e.g., CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Sys., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (N.D.
Ga. 2007) ("The Court's 'new standard' was merely a specific way to articulate a solution to what
it perceived to be a specific pleading problem, in a specific area of law that inflicted a high cost upon
antitrust defendants.").
9 See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Tlhe Court [in Twomby] is not
requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible
'plausibility standard,' which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in
those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claimplausible.'). For a scholarly
acknowledgment of the flexible standard, see Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A 'Plausible"Explanaion
of PleadingStandards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 31 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 827, 838 (2008).
"' Admittedly, this intermediate standard (applying heightened pleading in certain
circumstances) is somewhat at odds with FED. R. Civ. P. 1 and the generally "transsubstantive"
nature of the Rules. Despite this tension, the Second Circuit in Iqbal adopted this approach and it
is the approach most in accord with the language of Twomb. See Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist.,
499 F.3d 538, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing the adoption of Iqbalapproach in several district
courts in the Sixth Circuit).
" Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-61 (2007).
12 See id. at 565 n.10 (explaining that Form 9-the sample form for a negligence
complaint-satisfies the notice function of pleading); CBTFlintPartners,529 F. Supp. 2d at 1379-81
(relying, in part, on the existence of Form 16-a sample patent infringement complaint form-as
basis for limiting the effect of Twomb on patent infringement pleadings). Notably, CBT Flint
Partnersalso relies on the heightened pleading requirements set forth by local district court rules.
Id. at 1380-81. Ironically, prior to Twomb4, these local rules might have been unacceptable
heightened pleading standards under Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
13 See 4-13 MELvILE B. NIMMER, NhMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (2008) (explaining that
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roadblocks for plaintiffs. For example, a plaintiff might be required to allege the
defendant's copying to a point of plausibility-a difficult task where the claimant
must rely on indirect evidence. Moreover, the substantive element of "copying"
can be challenged as a potentially "neutral" element, failing to show any wrongful
conduct. Copying does not implicate liability where the copied elements lack
originality, 4 or copying occurred but the two works at issue are not substantially
similar. 5
Aside from the unique attributes of copyright litigation, heightened pleading
should be avoided in these suits as a matter of public policy. Requiring
plausibility, as opposed to mere notice, during the pleading stage acts as a barrier
to plaintiffs seeking to bring infringement suits. Generally, only copyright
proprietors, exclusive licensees, and beneficial owners have standing to bring a
claim of infringement. 6 As such, it will often be the original creator of the
protected work, the creator's heirs, or a purchaser of the interest who seeks to
enforce the copyright. Each right holder represents a potential plaintiff, and any
increased barrier to bringing suit will result in a less valuable copyright. Stated
alternately, making it harder to enforce a copyright results in a less valuable
exclusive right. Furthermore, devalued copyright protection reduces the incentive
to create socially desirable works and counteracts the intended purpose of
copyright protections: To promote creative works and combat underproduction. 7
This Note explains why Twombly should rarely (if ever) impose heightened
pleading standards in copyright infringement suits. Part II begins with a brief
description of pleading standards as they existed before 2007. Next, a brief
description of the facts, rationale, and policy motivations underlying the Court's
decision in Twomby is provided. Part II also describes copyright infringement
pleading requirements as they existed before Twomby. Part III demonstrates that
although Twomby may be applied beyond the antitrust context, it should not be
extended to copyright infringement complaints. Moreover, applying a heightened
plausibility standard to copyright infringement complaints may have negative
erosion-like effects on the strength of copyright protection. Part IV summarizes
the effects that Twomby has had on the practice of notice pleading, and why courts
should seek to minimize such effects in copyright infringement suits.

copying is often established by indirect evidence which must show access and substantial similarity).
'4 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (stating that
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement" for copyright protection).
15 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that only a substantial
amount of copying constitutes infringement).
16 3-12 MELvILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.02 (2008).
17 KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 26-36

(2000).
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II.

BACKGROUND: KEELHAULING NOTICE PLEADING

A. PRE-TWOMBLY NOTICE PLEADING

Notice pleading is "[a] procedural system requiring that the pleader give only
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief, and not a complete detailing of all the facts."'" In the United States federal
court system, this concept is embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2),
which explains that "a claim for relief must contain... a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Notice pleading
achieves efficiency through a legal system that compensates for minimal pleading
at the outset of the suit by permitting fact gathering during the discovery phase
and by allowing for summary adjudication for claims lacking merit, determined
once the discovery process is complete. 9
The United States federal courts adopted the practice of notice pleading in
response to the earlier standards of fact and code pleading.2" Both fact and code
pleading were found to be cumbersome and unworkable. These earlier standards
reduced the likelihood of resolution on the merits of cases, often leading to
adjudication based on the artfulness of a pleading's drafting.2' In 1938, Congress
enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in an effort to curtail the negative
effects of prior pleading standards.2 In 1957, the Supreme Court described the
minimal requirements of notice pleading in Cony v. Gibson.23 From 1957
until 2007, the Supreme Court continually reaffirmed and reiterated the especially
lenient standard defined in Conly for determining the sufficiency of pleadings
pursuant to Rule 8(a). 24 Then, in 2007, the Supreme Court drastically altered its
approach to notice pleading.25 In BellAtlanic Corp. v. Twomby, the Supreme Court

18

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1191 (8th ed. 2004).

'9 5 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§1202 (3d ed. 2004).
20

Id.

21 Jason G. Gottesman, Comment, Speculatingas to the Plausible: Pleadng PratceAfterBellAtlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 976-78 (2008).
A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibiiy Pkaing 49 B.C. L. REv. 431,434-35 (2008).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
24 Spencer, supra note 22, at 436-39 (pointing to Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) and the more recent Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema NA., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002)).
25 Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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explicitly and vehemently rejected the "no set of facts" language from ConIly, 26 a
radical departure from the prevailing jurisprudence of prior decades.
B. BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY

The Twomby ruling sent shockwaves through the American legal community,
calling into question the fundamental rules of notice pleading. The opinion left
many unsure of just what the Court intended to accomplish and exactly how lower
courts were supposed to interpret the opinion. A proper understanding of the
impact of Twomby begins with a review of the facts.
1. Facts. A group of consumers brought a class action suit based on violations
of the Sherman Act against a group of local telephone and internet services
providers. 21 The plaintiffs alleged the defendant service providers had engaged in
price fixing agreements as well as agreements to not compete with one another,
thus violating 15 U.S.C. § 1 (section 1 of the Sherman Act). 5 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants "engaged in parallel conduct" in order to shut
out (or at least diminish competition from) competitive local exchange carriers
(CLECs).2 9 Essentially, the plaintiffs' foundation for alleging violations of the
Sherman Act was that the defendants had failed to meaningfully compete with one
another.3" The Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
sufficiently plead a claim.31
2. The Trouble with Twombly. The thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Twombly was that a complaint, which asserted that the defendants engaged in
parallel conduct and refrained from competing with one another, is not (without
more) sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, given that liability under the
Sherman Act requires a "contract, combination.. ., or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce. ' '3 2 Despite the relatively straightforward issue, the Court went
well beyond what was required to resolve the principal matter.33 The Court's
opinion has caused considerable confusion,34 generating uncertainty on two fronts.

2 Id. at 562-63.
27 Id. at 548-51.
" Id. at 550-51. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, passed in 1890, has been construed by the
courts to "broadly prohibit[ ] concerted action that 'unreasonably' restrains the nation's domestic
or foreign trade." WILLAM C. HoLMEs, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:2 (2007).

' Twomb,, 550 U.S. at 550.
30 Id
31 Id. at 570.

32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2008).
" Colleen McMahon, The Law of UnintendedConsequences: Shockwaves in the Lower CourtsAfterBell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 859 (2008).
4 See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that "[c]onsiderable

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol16/iss2/2
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First, what is the scope of the opinion? Stated alternately: Does the Court's
discussion of pleading requirements apply only to antitrust complaints, only to
certain types of complaints (of which antitrust is one of many), or to all
complaints? Second, did the Court intend to require more stringent pleading
standards compared to traditional notice pleading, or did it simply restate existing
standards?
The first issue of confusion, the scope of the opinion, lies in the seemingly
dualistic approach the Court employed. At the outset of the opinion, the Court
explained the fundamentals of antitrust liability.3" But after this brief discussion
of substantive law, the Court proceeded to discuss broadly motions to dismiss and
general principles of notice pleading.36 In the Court's discussion of adequate
pleading requirements, it continually referred to the seminal case Conle v. Gibson.3"
The copious attention to Conly is important for two reasons. First, Conly was not
an antitrust case. This is one indication that the Court intended Twomby to apply
to non-antitrust suits as well. Second, and more importantly, Conly has long stood
as a foundation for interpreting Rule 8(a)(2).3" Conley is not simply a footnote in
federal procedure case law; it has been viewed as a crucial tenet of liberal notice
pleading.39 The Twombyl Court proceeded to expound on general pleading
requirements, but also intermittently discussed specific antitrust pleading
At no point in the opinion did the Court clearly limit its
requirements.'

uncertainty" was created by Twomby); Gottesman, supra note 21, at 993, 999 (complaining that
"Twomb# is a mess" and "[tlhe confusion of the opinion is self-evident").
35 Twomb#y, 550 U.S. at 553-54.
36 Id.at 557-61 (discussing complaints made pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and motions

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).

Id.at 555, 561-64 (discussing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), which reversed a lower
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint alleging unlawful employment discrimination prohibited
under a collective bargaining agreement). Conley discussed the requirements for the adequacy of a
complaint under Rule 8(a)(2) at length and provided a very light standard: "a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) provides the requirements for stating a claim for relief: "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
39 Gottesman, supranote 21, at 985--86 (calling Conley a "talisman" for federal courts); Tice, supra
note 9, at 827 (referring to Conleys "no set of facts" language as a "mantra").
40 Twomby, 550 U.S. at 553-62. The Court discusses applying these standards to a 15 U.S.C. § 1
claim and states "it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance
of discovery, . . . but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be
expensive." Id.at 558. However, at other times the Court discusses pleading requirements at length
with little reference to the antitrust context and several references to non-antitrust suits for support.
Id.at 555, 560-63.
17
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explanations of pleading requirements to antitrust suits. 41 The result is that
Twomby created great confusion over its scope.
The decision presents a second confusing issue: Where Twomby is applicable,
what must a complainant plead to survive a motion to dismiss?" Some language
indicates that a new and "heightened" pleading standard was intended, while other
language explicitly or implicitly rejects that notion. The two most notable reasons
for reading Twomby as a mandate for heightened pleading requirements are the
Court's outright rejection of Conles "no set of facts" language and the Court's
continual assertion that plausibility is required at the pleading stage.
On the other hand, the Court expressly stated that it was not applying a
heightened pleading standard.43 Also, the Court referred to other language in
Conley that describes very liberal notice pleading, and explained that Form 9 in the
Federal Rules' Appendix of Forms (a picture of minimal notice pleading) would
be a sufficient complaint.' Despite the conflicting messages expressed in Twomby,
many courts have concluded that Twomby sets forth a new pleading standard that
requires greater specificity in complaints. 45 But lower courts have not been
uniform in their interpretation of the plausibility standard.' These differing
stances on plausibility are typically grounded in a lower court's reliance on certain
portions of Twomby (and disregard for others) or recognition of the various policy
concerns addressed in Twombly.
3. Applicaion ofTwombly ByondAnitrust. A small number of district courts
have viewed Twomby as applying only to antitrust cases.47 However, this narrow
view has not been broadly accepted and seems contrary to both Twomblfs overall
tone and its frequent references to non-antitrust cases.48 A better reading indicates

" Additionally, there is support for the notion that the Federal Rules are "transsubstantive,"
and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the rules must apply to all civil suits. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1
("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district
courts, except as stated in Rule 81.'); Spencer, supranote 22, at 457 (stating that the rules are "on
their face transsubstantive, meaning that Rule 8(a)'s pleading standard applies to all cases regardless
of their substance").
42 See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' recent analysis of the
conflicting signals in Twomb4 and how to apply the plausibility standard).
4 Twomb, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14.
4 Id.
at 565 n.10.
41 Spencer, supra note 22, at 458 ("[1Hfundreds of published lower federal court opinions...
have read Twomb4 as announcing a new pleading standard.").
' See Gottesman, smpra note 21, at 1004-24 (analysis of the circuit court decisions after
Twomb).
7 See, e.g., Kersenbrock v. Stoneman Cattle Co., No. 07-1044-MLB, 2007 WL 2219288, at *2
(D. Kan. July 30,2007); United States v. Harchar, No. 1:06-cv-2927, 2007 WL 1876510, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio June 28, 2007).
48 See Gottesman, supra note 21, at 1023-24 (describing the Second Circuit's rationale in Iqba).
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a broad reach, encompassing many if not all civil suits. First, Twomby retired the
Coney "no set of facts" language. This portion of Conley has been universally
applied to all types of civil suits. It would be extremely shortsighted for the Court
to overturn a mainstay of notice pleading, only to secretly intend that the holding
of the opinion be limited to a specific area of law. Second, in footnote 10 of
Twomb~y, the Court discusses the adequacy of a negligence complaint based on
Form 9.49 Here, the Court recognizes that such a complaint would be adequate
under the plausibility standard set forth. This footnote not only shows that the
Court envisions the application of Twomby outside of antitrust suits,' but also
provides instruction on when plausibility pleading standards are satisfied."'
Overall, there is strong support for the notion that the Supreme Court envisions
some applicability of the opinion outside the antitrust context.
Perhaps as a signal to the lower courts, the Supreme Court cited Twomby in
Erickson v. Pardus just two weeks after publication of Twomblv. Erickson, in
resolving a motion to dismiss, stated that "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the
statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.' ,,2 Erickson involved a complaint by a pro se
prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights.53 The reference in Erickson to Twomby says little about the full
extent of Twomby, 4 but it does provide valuable insight into the Court's
assumption that Twomby's scope extends beyond antitrust suits. A further
indication that Twombly applies beyond the antitrust area can be found in the
55
recent application of the case to other types of suits by the circuit courts.

Twomby, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
o See Tice, supra note 9, at 830 ("[D]uring oral arguments, various Justices referred to Form 9
in the Appendix of the Federal Rules, indicating their concern with model pleading across subject
matter.').
5" See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the significance of footnote 10 and the adequacy of complaints
based on the sample complaint forms).
52 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (explaining the requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
and citing Twomby).
5" Id.at 89. In Erickson, the Court determined that the complaint should survive a motion to
dismiss, plausibility requirements were not discussed, and the plaintiff's pro se status required the
district court to liberally construe the complaint. Id.
s See McMahon, supra note 33 ("Perhaps Erickson simply means that Twomby's 'plausibility'
standard, like all pleading standards, is to be applied less stringently to pro se plaintiffs."); Spencer,
supra note 22, at 456-57 (asserting that Erickson is "not a proper case in which to test how the Court
will apply Twomb4 in subsequent cases'). But see Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of
Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore,J, dissenting in part) ("[]f there was any doubt
whether Twomb4 altered the pleading requirements, the Supreme Court put that doubt to rest in

[Erickson].').
" SeeAlvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying Twomb4 to
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress complaint); Equal Employment
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Understandably, such early application by lower courts, without approval (or even
acknowledgment) by the Supreme Court, does not indicate that a broad
application of Twomby will endure. However, until the Supreme Court clarifies its
position on Twomby, the lower courts will continue to define the extent of the
opinion.
C. ESTABLISHING PLAUSIBILITY AFTER TWOMBLY

This Note proceeds under the assumption (like many lower courts) that
Twomby applies beyond the bounds of antitrust suits. This assumption naturally
leads to the next inquiry: What must non-antitrust complaints plead to survive a
motion to dismiss post-Twomby? In Twomby, the Court explains that Rule 8(a)(2)
requirements are intended to provide notice to the defendant of "what the...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. '56 Footnote 3 emphasizes that the
Federal Rules have not eliminated the need for complaints to contain some facts,
and points out that notice of the "grounds" upon which a claim rests will
inevitably require some factual pleading. 7 Next, the Court concludes that an
antitrust complaint must contain enough factual material to indicate an agreement
was formed. 8 This requirement of suggestive facts, the Court holds, means an
antitrust complaint must assert plausible grounds to infer "agreement" (a
substantive element of liability). 59 Here, plausibility requires "enough fact to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement."6
From this point the Court explores the factors that it considered in determining
plausibility.
1. Cost of Discovery. The Twomby Court places great emphasis on the cost of
discovery in antitrust suits.6 This concern is questionable, given that discovery
expense has nothing to do with whether a complaint pleads enough facts to

Opportunity Comm'n v. Concentra Health Serv., 496 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying
plausibility requirement to Title VII complaint); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495
F.3d 191,205 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying plausibility requirement to complaint seeking recovery from
insurance providers).
5 Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007) (quoting Conl). Note that Footnote 10
of Twomb#y emphasizes evaluating the complaint from the defendant's point of view, placing
importance on whether the defendant can adequately respond to the complaint. Id at 565 n.10.
17 Id. at 555 n.3. For an interpretation of Twomb4 envisioning a "two-pronged requirement"
(requiting both notice of the nature of the claim and notice of the grounds upon which the claim
rests) see Tice, supra note 9, at 837.
' Twomb#, 550 U.S. at 556.
59 Id.
60 id.
61 Id. at 557-60.
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establish plausible grounds. Instead, it appears that the Court views preventing
excessive discovery costs as a policy goal furthered by the requirement of
plausibility at the pleading stage. Coupled with this policy, the Court also makes
two other observations: (1) Rule 8 requirements should guard against complaints
which are likely to generate in terroremsettlement value (through costly discovery),62
and (2) trial courts are often unable to guard against the consequences of costly
discovery by limiting the scope of discovery.63 These concerns speak little to the
substance of determining plausibility, but they do reveal the Court's motivations
for requiring plausibility at the pleading stage.'
2. Factually-NeutralElements. The Court then turns to the standards for
establishing plausibility in an antitrust complaint. The Court explains that facts
falling within the "neutral territory" are insufficient to establish plausibility.65 As
applied in the principal case, the Twomby Court says that where defendants'
"agreement" is required for a violation of the Sherman Act, plausibility is not
established by an allegation of mere "parallel conduct" which could be either
lawful or unlawful.66 A. Benjamin Spencer reads this portion of Twombl as
establishing "zones of pleading."67 Spencer posits that for an allegation to move
from the "neutral zone" to the "zone of plausibility" requires that the facts alleged
"paint a plausible picture of liability thereby 'showing' that the pleader is entitled
to relief"; conversely, complaints making factual allegations that are "consistent
both with liability and with innocent alternative explanations" are insufficient to
survive motions to dismiss.68 Spencer also acknowledges that a proper reading of
Twomby indicates that plausibility may require different standards of factual
pleading depending upon the type of case challenged by a motion to dismiss.6 9 In
sum, a pleading containing only "neutral" factual assertions may be grounds for
dismissal as a failure to assert a plausible claim, but distinct substantive areas of
law may entail different definitions of neutrality and plausibility.

62

Id. at 557-58.

63 Id at 559-60.
64 When is discovery "expensive" enough to become a concern? The TwombyCourt refers to

a memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000), explaining that where
discovery is actively employed, it accounts for as much as ninety-percent of litigation costs. Also,
the action in Twomb/y threatened particularly burdensome discovery because the plaintiffs
represented over ninety-percent of all subscribers of telephone and high-speed internet service and
the defendants were enormous firms with many employees. Id.at 559. The question remains:
What is sufficiently expensive discovery short of the potential costs threatened in Twomby?
65 Id at 557.
6 Id
67 Spencer, sapra note 22, at 448-50.
6' I. at
69 Id.

449.
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3. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Complaint Forms. Footnote 10 of Twomby
contains another noteworthy statement on plausibility pleading requirements.'
There, the Court discusses how the principal complaint failed to provide the
defendant with sufficient notice required by Rule 8."' The Court explains that
Form 9, a sample negligence complaint found in the Federal Rules' Appendix of
Forms, provides sufficient notice to the defendant while the principal complaint
did not." Form 9 provides sufficient notice, the Court explained, because it
includes a brief narrative explanation including the time, date, and location of the
events giving rise to the complaint.7 3 In contrast, the Twomby complaint failed to
explain where and when the defendants' agreement occurred and which
defendants' employees participated in the agreements.74 Here, the Court
emphasized again that the absence of certain facts prohibited the defendants from
adequately responding to the complaint.
Despite Twomby's strong indications that the Court was trying to rein in liberal
pleading standards, the Court explicitly rejected the creation of a heightened fact
pleading standard.75 Indeed, the Court overturned a major tenet of liberal notice
pleading and at the same time denied that it was doing anything more than
reaffirming established standards of pleading.76 To bolster its position, the
Twombly Court explained that many "judges and commentators have balked at
taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard."77 Essentially,
the Court posits that because many courts ignored the Conlg "no set of facts"
language it was no longer good law; or, lower courts have generally applied a

70

Twomb/y, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.

71 Id.
72

Id. It should be noted that the Appendix of Forms was amended shortly after Twombl was

decided, and the sample negligence complaint is now Form 11 rather than Form 9. Also, the prior
version contained fictitious locations and dates; the new form states, in relevant part: "On date, at
place, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff."
73

Id.

74Id
7S Id.at 569 n.14 (explaining that the complaint was not insufficient because it failed to allege
"particularized" facts, but rather because it "failed in toto
to render plaintiffs' entitlement to relief
plausible").
76 Other concerns also might have been on the minds of the Justices. See McMahon, supra
note 33, at 865 (indicating that if "plausibility" means "believability," Seventh Amendment
protections for jury trials might be implicated).
77Twomby, 550 U.S. at 562 (citing cases). This perception of the Court has been substantiated.

See Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Princple of Substantive Sufideng Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure8(a)(2): Toward a StructuredApproacbto FederalPleaang Practice,243 F.R.D. 604, 604 (2006)
("[L]ower federal courts more than occasionally inhale the mantra of simplified pleading and exhale
a heightened pleading standard.").
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plausibility requirement, so the Court should now embrace a less than liberal
pleading requirement.
4. Second CircuitApproach. For all the above reasons, the confusion generated
by Twomby is well-founded. As the district courts and the circuit courts continue
to struggle with the application of Twombly, trends will likely emerge. One
approach that appears to be gaining acceptance is that taken by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Iqbal v. Haso. s In Iqbal, the Second Circuit addressed the
sufficiency of a complaint, alleging constitutional torts against United States
officials during the plaintiff's detention. 9 The court had to determine the level of
factual pleading required to survive a motion to dismiss where a plaintiff must
overcome a defense of qualified immunity.'s The Iqbalcourtfaced the ambiguities
and challenges of Twomby head-on, and as a result arrived at two conclusions: (1)
Twomby applies to more than just antitrust cases; and (2) Twomby requires "a
flexible plausibility standard," which requires heightened
fact pleading where such
81
facts are necessary to make the claim plausible.
Based on its "flexible plausibility standard," the Second Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part the trial court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss,
and ultimately remanded the case. The court held that, under Twomby, conclusory
allegations relating to some elements of the plaintiff's claims might be insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss.82 The Second Circuit recognized that cases
implicating qualified immunity might create policy concerns analogous to those
recognized by Twomby; namely, meritless claims would create significant burdens
on defendants through broad-ranging discovery. 3 Most of the plaintiff's claims
were found to be sufficient under a "flexible plausibility standard," though one
claim was dismissed-the plaintiffs claim of a violation of his procedural due
84
process rights.

71 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Ashcroft v. Iqbal sub nom. 128 S.
Ct. 2931 (U.S. June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015 (oral arguments on Dec. 10, 2008)); seealso McMahon,
supra note 33, at 861-62 (referencing approval of Iqbal to some extent in the Third, Sixth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, as well as the Federal Circuit). Iqbal is particularly desirable as a guide for
applying Twomb4b because the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari for the case, and it is quite
possible that the Court will address the Second Circuit's application of Twomby.
79 Iqbal,490 F.3d at 147-51.
goId at 153.
" Id. at 157-58; see also McMahon, spra note 33, at 863 (interpreting Iqbalas a statement that
"Twomby requires more factual detail in complaints that allege more complex theories of liability,
so as to render the plaintiff's allegations 'plausible' rather than simply speculative").
82 Iqbal,490 F.3d at 158.
83

Id.
Id. at 177-78.
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The Iqbal approach appears to be largely in-line with the Supreme Court's
primary concerns in Twomby. The Second Circuit acknowledged the burdens
imposed on defendants by discovery; it addressed whether factual allegations
provided sufficient notice to defendants (pointing to time and place); and, it
considered the nature of the lawsuit. However, Iqbal deviates sharply from
Twomby in one important way: the Second Circuit explained that for certain
claims that were borderline-nearly plausible but containing conclusory or neutral
factual allegations-the weakness of the complaint could be resolved by
proceeding with a "carefully limited and tightly controlled discovery" by the
plaintiff, or by a defendant's motion for a more definite statement pursuant to
Rule 12(e).8 5 The Twomby Court clearly stated that controlled discovery would not
supplant the requirements of plausibility.' It may be that the Second Circuit
interpreted Twomb~y's discussion of the insufficiency of controlled discovery to
solve pleading problems as relating only to discovery in a complex antitrust suit.
In the context of qualified
immunity charges, controlled discovery was a desirable
87
and functional solution.
Regardless of the particular nuances of Iqbal, the Second Circuit's
interpretation of Twombfy is well-reasoned and has gained support in other
circuits." Therefore, this Note proceeds with a few assumptions about Twomby
that are articulated by the Second Circuit in Iqbal. First, Twomb/y's plausibility
pleading requirements apply to cases other than antitrust suits. Twomby's
plausibility requirements will be most relevant where the litigation is complex.
Where litigation is simple, satisfaction of a plausibility standard will often be
identical to satisfaction of traditional liberal notice pleading standards (i.e.,
automobile negligence complaints similar to Form 11). The burden of discovery
is relevant to applying and satisfying plausibility requirements-the higher the
potential burden, the greater the need for plausible factual allegations. Where
plausibility is tested, neutral factual allegations and conclusory statements (without
more) will not be sufficient for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. Lastly,
unless the value of controlled discovery can be adequately demonstrated, such
limited discovery should not be viewed as a solution to dealing with complaints
that fall short of plausibility.

85

Id at 178.

s Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-60 (2007).
87 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158.
s See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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D. TRADITIONAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

To understand how Twomby might affect the pleading requirements for a
copyright infringement complaint, it is necessary to consider previous approaches
to dealing with these complaints. For a significant period of American history,
copyright infringement procedure was governed by a separate body of rules: the
Copyright Rules of Practice. 9 However, in 2001 the Copyright Rules of Practice
were completely abrogated, and now the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern
copyright suits with full force.90 As such, the transsubstantive nature of the
Federal Rules requires that all case law interpreting the Rules applies with equal
relevancy when a Rule is implicated in a copyright suit. Despite the wide
acceptance that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are transsubstantive, many
practical remnants of the earlier Copyright Rules are still extant at the trial court
level during the pleading stage. 9' As such, commentators and courts generally
agree that four elements must be pleaded for a copyright infringement complaint
to survive a motion to dismiss: (1) identification of the specific copyrighted work,
(2) an assertion of ownership of the work, (3) registration of the copyright (or an
application for registration), and (4) identification of the infringing acts.92 These
elements are required under notice pleading and must be pleaded with some
specificity for a copyright infringement complaint to survive a motion to dismiss
for the failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).93
The challenge: Must plaintiffs alleging copyright infringement post-Twombyl
meet a heightened pleading standard-requiring more than the traditional
elements-to survive a motion to dismiss? On one hand, copyright infringement
suits have unique substantive attributes and a distinctive pleading standard. On
the other, one must take into account the considerations raised in Twomby, the
interpretations of Twombfy in the lower courts, and the ambiguous language of the
opinion itself. As will be shown, proper synthesis of these two areas requires
deference to the goals and functions of a notice pleading system.

s Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth ofNoice Pkading, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 987, 1037 (2003).
90Id
91 Id. at 1038.
92 See id.; 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 19:3.
9' Fairman, supra note 89, at 1038. Fairman argues that, although these four elements are
traditionally required by courts, such requirements are actually heightened pleading standards. He
explains that in a true notice pleading system elements (1) and (4) do not need to be specifically

pleaded so long as the defendant can answer the complaint Id
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E. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT PLEADING REQUIREMENTS VS. PRIMA FACIE CASE
ELEMENTS

One final attribute of copyright infringement suits must be considered when
evaluating the effects of Twombyl. the distinctions between the traditional pleading
requirements and the elements of the prima facie infringement case. First,
traditional pleading standards require a mere statement of ownership of the work,
but a prima facie case requires actual ownership of the work and that the work
consists of protected subject matter.94 The protected subject matter requirement
hinges on the constitutional requirement of "originality." 95 Moreover, the concept
of originality implicates a number of nuanced doctrinal issues, including inter alia.
the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine,96 the idea/expression
dichotomy,97 and
9
8
articles.
certain statutory bars on protection of useful
The Supreme Court's opinion in FeistPublications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co. is a prime example of a dispute over whether a plaintiff has established the
prima facie element of protected subject matter.99 In Feist the Court had to
determine whether the defendant's copying of the listings from the plaintiff's
telephone directory constituted infringement.'O° In order to do so the Court had
to determine what (if any) components of the plaintiff's work were protectable
subject matter. Specifically, the Court was required to look for the presence of
originality in the compilation of facts.
The second distinction is that traditional pleading standards require that the
plaintiff simply describe the violative acts, but the prima facie case requires an
unauthorized copying of a material amount of protected expression. This prima
facie element of copying is the heart of the infringement claim and consists of two

" See PATRY, supra note 92,§ 9:4 (defining elements of a prima facie case of infringement of the

reproduction right as (1) protected subject matter; (2) ownership by plaintiff of the right alleged to
have been infringed at the time it was infringed; and (3) unauthorized copying of a material amount
of expression).
" See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,346 (1991) (stating that originality
is the "bedrock principle" of copyright protection).
96 PATRY, supra note 92, § 3:36 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of the doctrine in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (stating that the courts should not
evaluate the artistic merit of a work, but rather should look for the presence or absence of
creativity)).
9 Id.
§ 4:3 (discussing the non-protection of facts as explained in Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
" Id.
§ 3:36 (discussing the interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) and the role of the courts in

shaping the separability doctrine).
" 499 U.S. at 363-64 (reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff and
holding that facts underlying a telephone directory's listings are not protected subject matter).
'00
Id at 342.
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components: (1) that the defendant copied from the plaintiffs work, and (2) that
the copying constituted a sufficient amount of protected material.'' Here again,
there are numerous doctrinal issues implicated in the prima facie element that are
not present in the pleading requirement.
A court may apply a "substantial similarity" test like the one in Three Bqys Music
Corp. v. Bolton to determine the first component of the copying element.' °2 In
Bolton, the defendants' song was not an identical copy of the plaintiffs' work (from
nearly forty year earlier), but the defendants' work contained many elements in
common with the original song."3 The defendants challenged the jury's verdict
on the grounds that the circumstantial evidence supporting the plaintiffs' claim of
copying was not adequately supported by the facts of the case. 3 " The Bolton court
examined both the access the defendant had to the plaintiffs' work and the degree
to which the two works were similar in order to determine whether an inference
of copying was appropriate." 5 Specifically, the court delved into the background
of the works, the popularity of the plaintiffs' song, the listening habits of the
defendants at the time the plaintiffs' song was most popular, and the degree to
which the two songs were similar. 0 6 Courts also use the substantial similarity
analysis to determine whether the defendant wrongfully misappropriated a
material amount of protected expression contained in the plaintiff's work. 7 Both
Bolton and Feist show that prima facie elements differ substantially from the
traditional pleading requirements of a copyright infringement action.
III. DISCUSSION: No SAFE HARBOR IN TWOMBLY
The ways in which courts actually apply Twomby plausibility are many and
varied, but a few principles have emerged. The nature of the suit is relevant to
determining plausibility. Courts should consider the policy concerns articulated
in Twomby.' 08 Additional factors are important, including: signals from the

'0' PATRY, supra note 92, § 9:16.
" Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cit. 2000) (affirming a jury verdict for
plaintiff's infringement claim on the grounds that inference was proper that defendants had copied
from plaintiff's work).
103Id at 485-86.
104 Id. at 480.
'0' Id. at 482-86.
106 Id.
"' See, e.g., Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127 (2d
Cit. 2003) (vacating and remanding a summary judgment in favor of defendant in copyright
infringement suit on the design of a decorative carpet upon finding that the two designs were
substantially similar).
108 See supra Part II.c.
1.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2009

17

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

J.INTELL PROP. L[

[Vol. 16:241

Federal Rules and the Appendix of Forms"°9 and whether the particular allegations
are "factually neutral." ' ° The ambiguous language of the Twomby decision will
provide the courts with significant flexibility indetermining which factors weigh
most in favor of or against imposing a more stringent standard on a plaintiff at the
pleading stage.
Copyright infringement suits are likely targets for Twomby-inspired
Rule 12(b) (6) motions. Defendants accused of infringement will feel empowered
by the seemingly increased pleading requirements set forth in Twomby and will rely
on portions of the opinion to cut against the strength of the plaintiffs' claims.
Despite the appeal of Twomby, infringement defendants should not be quick to
assume that it provides another arrow in the quiver. Considering the myriad of
factors that might indicate a need for heightened specificity in a complaint, the
vast majority of copyright infringement claims will not require such heightened
specificity. Rather, courts should conclude that most copyright infringement
complaints require minimal specificity, and thus should survive motions to dismiss
where only the barest of facts are alleged. Set in the language of Twombl
copyright infringement claims will be plausible and will rise above the speculative
level, even when the factual assertions are minimal. In most cases, the
determination of whether a copyright infringement complaint should survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion after Twomby will be identical to the determination of a
similar complaint before Twomb~y." 1 There may be exceptional cases where the
circumstances of a copyright infringement claim should require a heightened
degree of specificity to meet the plausibility requirements of Twomby, but these
circumstances will be rare, and must be distinguished from typical copyright
infringement claims.
A. THE COST OF DISCOVERY IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT SUITS

The Twomby court emphasized that permitting the plaintiffs' suits to advance
to the next stage of litigation would have imposed an excessive discovery cost on
defendants." 2 Generally, lower courts applying Twomby have ignored this concern
and have not made explicit mention of the potential costs of discovery as a
concern when dismissing claims as implausible.' 3 Instead, courts typically rely on

109 See supraPart II.c.3.

110See supraPart II.C.2.
Ill See supraPart II.D (discussing traditional copyright infringement pleading requirements).
112 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
113

However, there have been two notable exceptions: (1) Some antitrust cases have considered

the expense and burdens of discovery on defendants, e.g., DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp.,
No. 08-cv-1531, 2008 WL 4812440, at *2-3 (N.D. IUl.Oct. 28,2008), (2) Iqbalconsidered the unique
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Twomb!y's language explaining the requirements for plausibility. This could be
because Twombyl does not provide a clear guideline for establishing at what point
discovery becomes so burdensome that it should be considered a factor in
requiring greater specificity in a complaint." 4 Or, it is possible that very few cases
pose the potential for excessive discovery costs like in Twomby. A third possibility
is that courts are simply unwilling to consider the cost of discovery when deciding
whether to dismiss a complaint. Conversely, courts are comfortable deciding if
the complaint is sufficiently plausible and provides the defendant with adequate
notice. For whatever reasons, courts have not indicated that the potential for
expensive discovery will be a significant concern in deciding motions to dismiss.
In copyright infringement claims, the concern over discovery expense will
almost never be comparable to the expense in Twombly and should not significantly
impact a court's determination of pleading requirements. First, the number of
plaintiffs will never be commensurate to the class in Twomby."5 The nature of
copyright infringement requires that suits be brought on behalf of rights-holders,
and thus only a limited number of plaintiffs will initiate each suit." 6 Second, the
number of defendants might be large but will very rarely be on the scale of those
in Twomby." 7 For example, a record company might bring an infringement suit
against users of a peer-to-peer network, designed to share digital copies of
protected recordings. Although there might be many defendants, the heart of the
matter is whether infringement occurred via the network. Thus, discovery will
seek to uncover the specific instances of infringement. It will be the rare
copyright infringement suit which targets a large class of defendants. Normally,
one party will engage in infringing behavior that is clearly identifiable at the outset
of the suit. Most discovery in copyright infringement suits will be directed at
determining the specifics of the conduct (i.e., time, location, and methods), not at
uncovering the clandestine efforts among numerous large corporations as in
Twomby.
The Twomby court also indicated that tightly controlled discovery would not
have been a sufficient solution to the problem of burdensome discovery expenses
in that case." 8 However, in Iqbal the Second Circuit, relying on Twomby,
determined that controlled discovery would be a viable solution to the problem

burdens imposed on government officials. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2007).

114 Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (finding that the potential discovery
expense was "obvious" in that case because class of plaintiffs included a large number of
subscribers, and defendant firms were some of the nation's largest service providers).
"' See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
116 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 12.02.
'"
"s

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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of discovery costs based on the circumstances of that case." 9 Therefore, it would
appear that Twomb'ys rejection of controlled discovery is not a rule that must be
applied in every circumstance, but only in those cases where anj discovery would
be unduly burdensome on the defendant. In the vast majority of copyright
infringement suits, it seems unlikely that tightly controlled discovery would impose
such an undue burden on defendants as to require heightened specificity in the
pleading stage. More often, plaintiffs will be motivated to initiate copyright
infringement suits based on identifiable, public conduct which indicates
infringement. As such, discovery will be devoted to uncovering the specifics of
the conduct and will not generate broad-ranging, expensive discovery.
If courts decide to consider the potential costs of discovery when evaluating
motions to dismiss infringement complaints (which seems uncommon), these
courts should also feel comfortable in considering whether controlled discovery
is sufficient to offset potentially excessive discovery costs. In most cases,
controlled discovery will be unnecessary, but where it is appropriate it will be a
sufficient alternative to heightened pleading requirements, given the nature of
copyright infringement actions.
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF FORM 19 TO COPYRIGHT PLEADING

Twombfy discussed and affirmed the validity of Form 9, the sample negligence
complaint, in its discussion of pleading standards. 2 ° Given this approval, it would
appear that the presence of a copyright infringement sample complaint (Form 19)
in the Federal Rules Appendix of Forms would immediately foreclose any
application of Twombyl plausibility requirements in copyright infringement
complaints.' 2 ' However, the Form should not be categorically relied upon.
Because liberal notice pleading has remained unquestioned for so long, and
because the Conley "no set of facts" language has underscored that tradition, there
has been little need to question the importance and strength of the forms.
TwombLy did refer to Form 9, but it did so to demonstrate the absence of certain
key components of the antitrust complaint at issue."2 Reading this portion of
TwombLy as a pronouncement against any "plausibility" challenge to the bare bones
of the Forms would be overly broad and formalistic. Rather, Twomby indicates

119 See supranote 87 and accompanying text.
120
121

See supranote 72 and accompanying text.
Cf. Yekaterina Korostash, Pkading Standardsin Patent Ltigation After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 14 No. 4 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1 (2008) ("Form 16 ... appear[s] to protect
plaintiffs in patent suits from any heightened pleading requirements that Twomb# might otherwise
impose.").
122 See supra Part II.c.3.
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that in a simple negligence suit Form 9 provides enough notice to make the claim
plausible. Twomby should not be taken to mean that all negligence complaints will
be sufficient if they follow the limited framework set forth in Form 9. Indeed,
there may be a negligence suit where the complaint provides the time and location
of an event (the two aspects of Form 9 Twomby found most important) but does
not allege a plausible claim.
Plaintiffs in copyright infringement suits may turn to Form 19 for guidance in
drafting complaints, but they must be cautious not to rely on the presence of the
Form as an airtight response to a Twombyl-inspired motion to dismiss. In short,
Form 19 may guide the practitioner in determining what must be alleged in a
plausible complaint, and it may aid the court in determining what must be present
to provide the defendant proper notice under Twomby. However, it should not
be viewed as an exhaustive list of requirements for creating a plausible claim.
Form 19 provides the defendant with the most essential components of a
copyright infringement allegation: originality, ownership, registration of the
copyright, copying (date and method), and notice."z In almost all cases, factual
allegations establishing these elements will satisfy Twombys plausibility
requirements.' 24 However, plaintiffs must be wary; relying too heavily on Form 19
in complicated or unusual copyright infringement suits presents the very real
possibility of a grant of dismissal post-Twomby.
C.

SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS

Prior to Twomby it was widely accepted that a copyright infringement claim
should survive a motion to dismiss if four essential elements were adequately
stated: "(1) specification of the copyrighted work at issue, (2) that plaintiff owns
that work, (3) that registration has been obtained where required, and (4) the acts
by which defendant violated plaintiff's rights, and during what time period. '' 25
The significance of these four elements is crucial in light of Twomby. On the one
hand, these elements are arguably more than what should be required under a pure
notice standard. 26 On the other hand, these four elements fall short of

'23 PATRY,

supranote 92, § 19:3.

See Fairman,supra note 89, at 1037-42. Fairman's comments show that, well before Twomb4
was decided, some viewed copyright pleading as requiring a greater level of specificity than is
normally required under liberal pleading standards. The newly revised Form 19 adheres to
Fairman's view, and perhaps shows that copyright pleading standards required Twomb4-like
plausibility long before Twomby was even decided.
125 PATRY, supra note 92, § 19:3.
126 See Fairman,supra note 89, at 1038.
124
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establishing a prima facie case of copyright infringement.12 1 Twombl seems to
approach adequate pleading as a point on a factual continuum: treating facts
which are speculative as falling short and treating plausible allegations as sufficient.
Copyright infringement defendants will surely argue that this continuum approach
requires plaintiffs to assert facts that make the prima facie elements of an
infringement claim plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Therefore,
the question seems to be whether Twomby plausibility requires a heightened level
of pleading, one approaching a statement of the prima facie elements compared
to the traditional four pleading requirements.
The two cases discussed in Part JI.E, Feistand Bolton, are good examples of why
courts should not interpret Twomby as a basis to dismiss infringement claims for
failing to plausibly plead prima facie elements.2 8 It is apparent that the cases
would not have been decided on their merits and that using such a rule would
essentially turn motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment. Had Feist
been decided under an interpretation of Twomby that required plausible pleading
of prima facie elements, the outcome would have been different. Under such a
rule, the trial court would have been forced to decide whether the plaintiff had
plausibly alleged that the defendant's copying infringed upon protected subject
matter, based only on the complaint without the benefit of discovery. In turn, the
plaintiff would have had to include a portion in his complaint that explained why
the compilation was a protected work. The final resolution of the case would have
been based on the ability of the plaintiff to describe the protectability of telephone
directories.
Bolton is also illustrative.2 9 In Bolton, the court considered a jury verdict on a
copyright infringement claim regarding the reproduction of a protected song. The
court engaged in extensive factual review to determine whether the jury's inference
of copying was appropriate. Again, one can imagine that this case would have
been resolved in a much different way under a post-Twomby rule requiring factual
allegations of prima facie plausibility. The plaintiffs' complaint would have had
to allege facts showing there was some level of access and that the works were
substantially similar. The defendants would surely have challenged the complaint
on the grounds that it did not allege plausible copying given the years between the
two works and the significant differences. The trial court would have been faced
with a valid motion to dismiss and no factual record. The resolution of such a
motion would depend largely on the artfulness of the original complaint and the
skill of the drafter of the motion to dismiss.

127 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

128See supra Part II.E.
'2
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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As both examples indicate, implementing a rule that ties the success of a
motion to dismiss to allegations of prima facie elements would increase the
likelihood that cases would be resolved based on the ability of the drafter rather
than the merits of the claim. A clear implication of such a rule is that motions to
dismiss would look more like motions for summary judgment, the difference
being that the factual record is contained in the complaint rather than created
through discovery. This consequence has not gone unnoticed in the wake of
Twomby. Richard A. Epstein states that Twomby was a "disguised motion for
summary judgment" granted because further discovery would have revealed no
additional information.13 ° Epstein further argues that Twombyl indicates that trial
courts should be more willing to enter judgments at the close of pleadings,
primarily where the plaintiff's factual allegations rest solely on information which
is publicly available. 3'
Perhaps in certain situations Epstein's approach is desirable, but the examples
indicate that copyright infringement disputes are commonly fact-specific and will
depend on the discovery phase to develop the legal issues. Courts should interpret
Twomby plausibility as a guide to ensure that the factual allegations of the
complaint plausibly support the traditional elements of infringement complaint
pleading. As an example, the plaintiff should be required to allege facts that
plausibly suggest ownership of the protected work, but disputes over whether the
work is protectable subject matter should be left to the summary judgment phase.
The four traditional requirements provide sufficient notice to the defendant of the
complaint and the grounds upon which relief are sought.'32 Further, these four
elements, taken together, should be sufficient to push the claim beyond the
"speculative level" and create a "reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
33
evidence" of infringement.
Lastly, courts should be hesitant to rely on any prima facie requirements in
evaluating motions to dismiss on a purely precedential basis. Regardless of the
statements about plausibility in Twomby, Swierki'ewic v. Sorema N.A. remains
established law. 3" The Court spoke clearly in SwierkiewicZ and held that pleading
requirements did not require an employment discrimination plaintiff to allege
enough facts to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.13 Comparing the
frequently equivocal language of Twomblv with the clarity of Swierkiewic.7 it seems

"3Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Moions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
SummagJudgments, 25 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (2007).
131

id

132 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
13' Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
13

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).

131Id. at 510-11.
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likely that the Supreme Court is not willing to embrace a prima facie standard at
the pleading stage.
D. "FACTUALLY

NEUTRAL"

ELEMENTS

OF A

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

COMPLAINT

It is also necessary to address the role of the four traditional pleading
requirements of copyright infringement in light of Spencer's "zones of pleading"
approach. 36 At its base, Spencer's approach interprets Twomby as requiring
dismissal of complaints which contain only factual allegations that are equally
consistent with liability or non-liability. Spencer labels such allegations as
"neutral" facts.'37 He points to the plaintiff's allegation of parallel conduct as an
example of a neutral fact. As indicated in TwombLy, this allegation could indicate
liability or a mutual decision of market actors to not compete with one another,
wholly devoid of liability.
Copyright infringement pleading requirements present a challenge under this
approach. The first three traditional pleading requirements are clearly neutral,
meant only to provide notice to the defendant: specification of the work,
ownership of the work, and registration where applicable. The fourth element,
identification of the violative acts, is troublesome. As noted, the substantive
elements of copying demonstrate that many of the violative acts a plaintiff may
allege could equally indicate infringing or innocent conduct.'38 For example, in
both Feist and Bolton the violative act was the copying of the plaintiff's work. In
Feist, the copying was innocent conduct because the underlying work was not
protected subject matter.'39 Conversely, the copying in Bolton was found to be
violative given the jury's inferences from the showing of sufficient access and
substantial similarity."
These cases show that the "zones of pleading" approach may not be well
suited to every sort of complaint. Indeed, in the case of copyright infringement
suits, the only logical response to strict rejection of neutral facts is to require the
plaintiff to plead substantive elements of the claim. The preceding section
demonstrates that requiring substantive pleading is not a desirable solution.
Although Spencer's approach has significant support in the text of Twombly,
adherence to such an approach is clearly at odds with resolving cases on their
merits. Courts should take the language from Twomby describing the neutrality of

13 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
138 See supra Part II.E.
139 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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facts as commentary about those specific antitrust allegations and consider this
language as a general balancing factor weighed against the enormous cost of
discovery present in that case. In copyright infringement suits the courts should
find plausibility satisfied by the adequate pleading of the four traditional
elements"' and disregard the Twombfy requirement that the facts be something
more than neutral.
E. POLICY

IMPLICATIONS

OF

PLAUSIBILITY

PLEADING

FOR

COPYRIGHT

INFRINGEMENT SUITS

Interpreting Twomb y plausibility as requiring significantly heightened pleading
for copyright infringement suits could have negative utilitarian consequences. Any
increase in pleading standards will have a chilling effect on the likelihood of rightsholders to bring suit. The threat of litigation is the strongest (and perhaps the only
effective) deterrent for would-be infringers. Therefore any impediment to
bringing an infringement suit should be viewed as an erosion of the protections
copyright holders retain. Eroding the protections that copyrights provide could
reduce the incentive for individuals to engage in the types of creative works
142
protected under copyrights.
A colorable argument could be made that raising pleading standards will have
only nominal effects on the actions of potential copyright holders or the actions
of potential infringers. However, this mistakenly minimizes the importance of
litigation and governmental enforcement to the incentive structures created by
intellectual property protection. Without the legitimate threat of government
intervention, the rights of copyright holders become valueless. The exclusivity
granted to the right-holder is the essential trade-off provided by the government
for the creator's efforts in generating a work. Without enforcement, there can be
no exclusivity, and without exclusivity economic value is diminished. Finally,
decreased economic incentives will result in a diminished quantity and quality of
creative works. The degree of correlation between the barriers to litigation and
the economic incentives of copyrights is extremely difficult to determine, but it
should not be ignored when considering the policy effects of shifts in judicial
doctrines. To do so would call into question the overarching framework created
by intellectual property regimes.
Maintaining the traditional liberal notice pleading requirements for copyright
infringement suits will not significantly harm defendants. Defendants will retain
the same means to combat frivolous infringement suits that they have always held.

141 See supra Part II.D.
142

See smpra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Motions to dismiss have long been suitable and reasonable means for defendants
On the other hand,
to challenge complaints that fail to establish a claim.
providing defendants with a Twomby-inspired defense will give infringing
defendants a means to evade legitimate suits simply because the plaintiff failed to
allege enough facts. Long before a case is ever considered, potential defendants
faced with the option to infringe or not will be influenced by a rule that makes it
harder for rights-holders to bring suit. A higher standard for plaintiffs to survive
the pleading stage will decrease the power of the copyright and reduce the
effectiveness of the device. Additionally, infringers will be given an extra
protection when they are brought before the court. With this rule, potential
defendants may breathe a little easier when they decide to infringe.
IV. CONCLUSION: PIRATES, PROCEED WITH CAUTION

Twomb/y created quite a kerfuffle, and the dust has yet to settle.'" Once the
lower courts sort out the implications of the case, it may be that Twomby was a
fundamental shift or simply a gentle nudge (or most likely something in between).
The merits of more stringent pleading requirements are highly contestable. At one
extreme, heightened standards provide the courts greater opportunities to filter
out frivolous and vexatious claims. At the other, they create the risk of sheltering
defendants from meritorious suits, the strength of which would be established in
a later stage of litigation. The degree to which Twomby will cause such effects
depends on how lower courts interpret and apply the plausibility requirement.
Copyright infringement claims should almost always be found to be plausible
as long as they adequately allege the four traditional requirements of copyright
infringement pleading. The vast majority of copyright infringement claims will
exhibit characteristics that require only the most minimal factual specificity. Few,
if any, will involve the enormous discovery costs that were threatened in Twomby.
Moreover, controlled discovery will be sufficient to avoid those costs where there
is a possibility of expensive discovery. Also, the fact that the Federal Rules
provide a sample complaint that provides minimal factual allegations supports a
minimal standard for copyright complaints. Any attempt to incorporate the
substantive elements of a copyright infringement suit into the pleading
requirements is ill-advised. First, it should not be permitted, given clear precedent
rejecting such an approach. Second, it is undesirable because it makes it likely that
suits will be decided based on the artfulness of drafting rather than the merits of

143 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
§ 1349 (3d ed. 2004).
144 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the case. Lastly, heightened pleading requirements should not be imposed on
copyright infringement plaintiffs given the negative incentive generated by
decreased enforceability of copyright protection.
In sum, a copyright infringement complaint that would have survived
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss before Twomby should survive a similar motion after
Twombyl. By limiting the impact of Twomb y on copyright infringement claims,
courts will ensure that claims are resolved at the appropriate stage of litigation with
the necessary factual support, and defendants accused of infringement will not be
able to evade litigation by attacking the artfulness of the complaint's drafter.
Benjamin W. Cheesbro

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2009

27

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol16/iss2/2

28

